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Abstract
The Taylor hypothesis is the conjecture that the 2007-2009 nancial crisis and the 2008-present
downturn have been caused by loose monetary policy during 2002-2006. According to the Taylor
hypothesis the Fed deviated from well-know rules of monetary policy-making over this period, and
this deviation caused an ine¢ cient boom and subsequent bust. I use a well know economic model
of the US aggregate economy (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005) to test this hypothesis.
I interpret shocks as deviations from Taylor-type rules. I conclude that the Taylor hypothesis for
the Taylor rule fails to reproduce observed uctuations in the data. Output increases only 0.3% at
maximum which occurs at 2004:Q2. In the data, the output gap was at its maximum in 2006:Q3.
However, the Taylor hypothesis modied to incorporate persistence in the policy rule can partly
explain the boom of the economy after 2001.
I thank Luis Bryce, Larry Christiano and Carlos Madeira for helpful discussions. I am especially grateful to
Daisuke Ikeda. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
Recent house price increases are attributable mainly to economic fundamentals
Bernanke (2005)
John Taylor (2007, 2009 and elsewhere) has argued that the origins of the 2007-2009 nancial
crisis lie in deviations from the Federal Reserve System away from Taylor-style rules of monetary
policy making during 2002-2006. In this paper I test for this hypothesis using the benchmark model
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), henceforth CEE (2005), imposing all functional forms,
and two alternative Taylor-style policy rules. This is an appropriate choice because it is a consensual
framework for empirically accurate simulated quantitative e¤ects of monetary policy shocks. I
calculate the magnitude of deviations from two Taylor-style rules for the 2002-2006 period. If these
were the relevant shocks of the period, it is necessary to calculate variance decompositions, which
is in line with the original Taylor hypothesis. Thus the models counterfactual unshocked growth
path constitutes a reasonable approximation to what the economy would have evolved like if the
deviations had not existed. By feeding these shocks into the model, I observe whether they are
su¢ cient to reproduce observed uctuations in the data.
2 The Taylor Hypothesis
Much of the discussion about the recent crisis and downturn has focused on contemporary policy
responses. The actual mechanism which lead to the crisis has been given less attention. For
example, in order to study optimal policy response to the crisis, Gertler and Kardi (2011) interpret
the origins of the crisis as a capital quality shock. While this shock-type interpretation can be useful
from the static perspective of an immediate policy response, it clearly leaves the actual origins of
the crisis as an open question.
Understanding the underlying cause of the crisis is important because it may suggest, rst, how
to prevent future occurrences; and second, how to best respond at present as well especially in
a way that doesnt create the "seeds" to a possible future crisis  a reasonable possibility in a
dynamic context. Optimal policy responses derived from unmeasurable and exogenous shock-based
interpretations to the source of the crisis ignore such possibility.
While many have blamed the crisis to ine¢ ciencies in the market sector and insu¢ cient regula-
tion, John Taylor has been a prominent supporter of a di¤erent explanation:
During the period from 2003 to 2006 the federal funds rate was well below what
experience during the previous two decades [would have predicted] ... with low money
market rates, housing nance was very cheap and attractive ... the surge in housing
demand led to a surge in housing price ination ... this jump in housing price ination
then accelerated the demand for housing in a upward spiral (Taylor 2007)
Taylors dating is that the departure initially occurred in the 2nd quarter of 2002 and ended in
the 3rd quarter of 2006. The quantitatively stronger departure period was 2003-2005. A reasonable
dating for the start of the crisis is August 2007. This was when the spread between the term
LIBOR rates and the overnight Fed funds rare jumped and soon the Fed was taking unprecedented
monetary policy measures which have to be considered subsequent deviations from rules-based
monetary policy. Thus in order to be internally consistent our analysis ends in the 2nd quarter of
2007.
2
3 Model
The CEE (2005) model consists of ve departures to the one sector DSGE model. These are: sticky
wages and prices (Calvo-style nominal contracts, with lagged ination indexation, i.e. dynamic
prince updating); adjustment costs in investment; habit dependent preferences; variable capital
utilization; and a working capital channel (rms must borrow the wage bill). I also impose all
of CEEs benchmark functional forms: separable preferences, logarithmic in consumption u() =
log(), quadratic in leisure z() =  0() and CES in real balances v() =  q ()
1 q
1 q , plus investment
adjustment costs S of the form F (it; it 1) =
h
1  S( itit 1 )
i
it , S(1) = S0(1) = 0 , S00(1) > 0,
and two restrictions on the capital utilization function: a(ut) s.t. ut = 1 in steady state, and
a(1) = 0. The price updating rule I use is dynamic updating t = t 1. The equilibrium dynamics
of the system (except for the description of monetary policy, which I discuss below) is described
in the appendix. I close the model with our only deviation from the benchmark CEE model, the
description of monetary policy.
3.0.1 Monetary Policy
Taylor rule (benchmark):
R^t = 1:5Et 1^t + 0:5y^t + "
Below I consider an alternative to this policy, but the above equation corresponds to the bench-
mark of the model, and arguably the closest description of the original Taylor hypothesis.
3.1 Solution Strategy
I adopt the standard sequence of markets equilibrium concept and the solution method in Christiano
(2002). Briey, this involves the following steps. First, I nd the nonstochastic steady state, which
is the steady state where all shocks are set to their means, and I show it is unique. It is to be noted
that to a rst order approximation, all Tak-Yun distortions are 1 (see Yun 1996).
Second, I take a linear approximation of the economy around the nonstochastic steady state.
Third, I nd a solution. A solution is a linear feedback rule relating the current period endogenous
variables to a set of state variables. It consists of two matrices, the feedback part, with consists of
endogenous state variables (controls of the previous period), and the feedforward part, generated
by some exogenous stochastic process (shocks). Together these two determine the current period
endogenous variables. The only shock I consider here is the shock to monetary policy, ". Dene a
vector zt which contains the 13 variables of the system which are endogenous at period t:
zt  [^t bqt bwt c^t bKt+1 m^t L^t R^t H^t u^c;t P^k0;t I^t K^t]
where qt  Qt=Pt 1, wt = Wt=Pt 1 and a hat denotes a deviation from the non-stochastic
steady-stae, i.e. x^t  (xt   x)=x, with x corresponding to the nonstochastic steady-state of xt.
I search for a solution of the form:
zt = Azt 1 +B"
where A is the feedback part and B the feedforward part.
3
3.2 Econometric Methodology
Again I follow the methodology of CEE (2005) to estimate and evaluate our model. The only
exception is again regarding the treatment of monetary policy. I also use their bechmark estimations
for the group of model parameters (f , w, p, q, , b, a).
3.3 Parameterization
A rst group of parameters (, , , ,  0,  q, w) is set by calibration.  = 1:03
 0:25,  = 0:36,
 = 0:025,  = 1:017, w = 1:05. The economic rational of such parameterization is described in
CEE (2005). I also calculate the xed cost parameter  such that steady-state prots are zero,  0
such that the steady-state value of L = 1 and  q such that the steady state value of the ratio Q=M
is 0:44. See CEE (2005) for discussion and details. For monetary policy, I use the Taylor rule as
described above. Finally, the third group of parameters (f , w, p, q, , b, a) should minimize
some measure of the distance between the model and empirical impulse response functions. For the
present purpose I will take as a rst approximation CEEs estimates from their own model (which
di¤ers in the monetary policy specication). These are f = 1:20, w = :64, p = :6, q = 10:62,
 = 2:48, b = :65, a = :01.
4 Results
In this section, I interpret shocks as deviations from the Taylor rule. I feed these shocks on the model
and compare the counterfactual response with actual uctuations in the data. Thus I estimate
the magnitude of those shocks for the 2002-2006 period. I use Taylor (2007)s own estimation:
Rt = 1+1:5t+0:5y^t where t is CPI ination rate and y^t is the deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott
lter.
4.1 Pure Taylor Rule
Consistent with Taylors hypothesis, I assume the relevant shocks to the economy in the 2002-2006
period where shocks to monetary policy in the form of deviations from the Taylor rule. For this
reason I dont calculate variance decompositions. I calculate the magnitude of these shocks for the
period, using Taylors own approach, i.e. backing it out of the Taylor rule. I use o¢ cial Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) data for the actual federal funds rate and consumer price index.
For the output gap I use Congressional Budget o¢ ce (CBO) data.
In the rst column of table 1 I present the shocks that the data suggests existed to the rule of
the form:
R^t = 1:5Et 1^t+1 + 0:5y^t + "
I feed these shocks into the CEE model described above. The result of this simulation is
presented on gure 1, which shows, for each variable of interest, the percentage deviation from
steady state values. The impulse response functions (IRFs) are on gure 2. The simulation is
dened relative to the counterfactual unshocked growth path, or what the economy would have
looked like without the deviations.
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Figure 1 here
Figure 2 here
The policy shock does not generate a boom in output. Output increases only 0.3% at maximum.
The timing is also o¤. In the data, the output gap was at its maximum in 2006:Q3. In this
simulation, the output was its maximum after 10 quarters, thus 2004:Q2. Output response is not
persistent and strong under the pure Taylor rule. This is consistent with the IRFs in gure 2, which
show little persistence and amplication.
4.2 CGG Taylor-type rule
I now consider an alternative treatment of monetary policy. I still interpret deviations as a sequence
of shocks to a static characterization of monetary policy. However now I allow these shocks to be
correlated. I adopt the Clarida et al (1999), post-1979 monetary policy characterization, which is
a Taylor-style rule of the form,
R^t = R^t 1 + (1  )[aEt 1^t+1 + ay y^t] + "t
where "t is a shock. I parameterize as Clarida et al (1999):  = 0:80, a = 1:5, and ay = 0:5.
The simulation is shown on gure 3, with the corresponding IRFs on gure 4.
Figure 3 here
Figure 4 here
This time there is persistence and amplication. The magnitude is also much larger than before:
now in the peak the output is more than 5% larger than its steady state level. Second, the peak
of output is now delayed to 16th period, 2005:Q4. The Taylor hypothesis modied to incorporate
persistence can explain to a large degree the boom of the economy after 2001.
5 Conclusion
The Fed deviated from well-know rules of monetary policy making during 2002-2006. These de-
viations started in early 2002 and peaked early to mid 2004, when the Fed funds rate was about
1% while the Taylor rule suggested 4.2%. The deviations lasted until 2006 and their cumulative
magnitude was substantial.
Evidence from the CEE model combined with these shocks suggests the following. For a pure
Taylor rule, the deviations are too small to generate the observed uctuations and timing of the
data. For this simulation, the policy shock does not generate a boom in output. Output increases
only 0.3% at maximum. The timing is also wrong. In the data, the output gap was at its maximum
in 2006:Q3. In this simulation, the output was its maximum after 10 quarters, thus about 2004:Q2.
Output response is not persistent and strong under the pure Taylor rule. The impulse response
functions lack persistence and amplication.
For a persistence-augmented Taylor rule of the Clarida-Gali-Gertler type, the simulated response
explains better the magnitude of the uctuations. Following the deviations output booms to more
than 5% its steady state level, and the the peak is delayed to 2005:Q4. This version can help
explaining the post-2001 boom and bubble (i.e the above steady-state growth) build-up.
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So what remains to be explained? In the simulation output it is already decreasing during
2006, but in the data it is was still rising until 2006:Q3, and then it crashed about a year later.
Further, the crash is more sudden in 2007 and again in 2008 in the data than in the model where the
downturn is smoother. One possibility is that market participants interpreted successive deviations
as a regime shift and hence adjusted their expectations about the Feds behavior. Agents may
have believed the Fed had come to care more about stabilization and market growth and less about
ination relative to what the CGG rule suggests. Indeed the "Greenspan put" was an expression
widely well-know in the nancial markets which suggests that agents started perceiving that each
time the stock market went down, the Fed would react (Ravn 2012). This must have had an e¤ect
on asset pricing, narrower credit spreads, and more risk taking. If so this can explain why the
rise in the Federal Funds rate starting in 2004 did not lead to an increase in the long-term rates
(the 2005 "Greenspan conundrum"), why output kept rising until late 2006, and the suddenness of
the crash in 2007 as agents go back to the original expectations about the behavior of the Fed.
Under the possibility that what may look like several shocks to the rule actually reected a change
in preferences of the central bank, and that this change was eventually internalized by the agents
(or at least that a change was perceived by the agents even if in fact the shocks were additive), the
correct treatment would be a change in the parameters of the rule itself, as opposed to an additive
shock. This is a relevant possibility, but one which is beyond the more humble scope of this paper.
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Figures
Figure 1. Percentage deviations from steady state (pure Taylor rule case)
Figure 2. Impulse response functions to an additive shock (pure Taylor rule case)
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Figure 3. Percentage deviations from steady state (Clarida-Gali-Gertler Taylor-type rule)
Figure 4. Impulse response functions to an additive shock (Clarida-Gali-Gertler Taylor-type
rule)
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Quarterly deviations from the Taylor rule
Taylor CGG
02:Q1 0.00 0
02:Q2 -0.45 -0.09
02:Q3 -0.77 -0.23
02:Q4 -0.95 -0.37
03:Q1 -1.76 -0.65
03:Q2 -1.94 -0.91
03:Q3 -2.49 -1.22
03:Q4 -2.69 -1.52
04:Q1 -3.00 -1.81
04:Q2 -3.20 -2.09
04:Q3 -3.24 -2.32
04:Q4 -2.94 -2.44
05:Q1 -2.62 -2.48
05:Q2 -2.21 -2.43
05:Q3 -1.99 -2.34
05:Q4 -1.47 -2.16
06:Q1 -0.96 -1.92
06:Q2 -0.46 -1.63
06:Q3 -0.01 -1.31
06:Q4 0.00 -1.05
Table 1. Quarterly deviations from the Taylor rule
Model description
Households
Consumption Euler equation (ct FONC):
Et 1uc;t = Et 1 t (1)
where marginal utility is,
uc;t =
1
ct  Ht   Etb
1
ct+1   bHt 1   v

t
mt
1 q
c
 q
t (2)
Deposits/Bonds/M Euler equation (Fisher) (Mt+1 FONC or "Fisher equation"):
 t = Et t+1
Rt+1
t+1
(3)
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Euler equation for real/cash balances (i.e. Qt FONC or "money demand", after imposing the
v() =  q ()
1 q
1 q functional form):
 qqt
 q +  t =  tRt (4)
Euler equation for kt+1:
Et 1 t = Et 1 t+1

ut+1r
k
t+1   a(ut+1) + Pk0;t+1(1  )
Pk0;t

(5)
Euler equation for investment (it FONC) after imposing the F (it; it 1) =
h
1  S

it
it 1
i
it,
S(1) = S0(1) = 0, S00(1) > 0 functional form:
Et 1 t = Et 1

 tPk0;tF1;t +  t+1Pk0;t+1F2;t+1

(6)
Note that the functional form implies that in a nonstochastic steady state, F1 = 1, F2 = 0 which
leads to the condition Pk0;t = Pk0;t+1 = 1.
Euler equation for capital utilization (ut FONC):
Et 1 t

rkt   a0(ut)

= 0 (7)
The functional form restriction that ut = 1 in steady state then implies a0 = rk.
Habit evolution equation:
Ht =  Ht 1 + bct 1 (8)
Calvo wages (imposing the demand curve for hj;t into the ~Wt FONC, and substituting):241  w( ~w;tw;t ) 11 w
1  w
351 w =  LKw;tFw;t (9)
where,
w;t  Wt
Wt 1
=
~wt
~wt 1
t (10)
and ~wt relates to wt:
wt =

 L
~wt
Fw;t
Kw;t
 1 w
1 (1+w)L
(11)
and the laws of motion,
Fw;t = lt
 t
w
+ w

1
w;t+1
 w
1 w ~
1
1 w
w;t
t+1
Fw;t+1 (12)
Kw;t = l
1+L
t + w

~w;t+1
w;t+1
 w
1 w (1 L)
Kw;t+1 (13)
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Firms
Calvo pricing ( ~Pt FONC, and dividing by Pt 1 and rearranging):
1  p( ~tt )
1
1 f
(1  p)
= (
Kp;t
Fp;t
)
1
1 p (14)
where,
Et

 tyt + (
~t+1
t+1
)
1
1 p pFp;t+1   Fp;t

= 0 (15)
and
Et

f tytst + p(
~t+1
t+1
)
f
1 f Kp;t+1  Kp;t

= 0 (16)
where output is kt 1 instead of kt reects adjustment costs,
yt = (p

t )
f
f 1

kt 1

(wt )
w
w 1 ht
1 
  

(17)
were capital services kt are related to physical capital kt through a utilization rate:
kt = utkt (18)
Updating Rules
~t = t 1 (19)
~w;t = w;t 1 (20)
Loan Market Clearing
WtLt = tMt  Qt
After dividing by Pt 1:
wtLt = tmt   qt
where (noting mt = MtPt 1 ):
t =
Mt
Mt 1
=
mtPt 1
mt 1Pt 2
=
mt
mt 1
t 1
so,
wtLt =

mt
mt 1
t 1

mt   qt (21)
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Aggregate Resource Constraint
a(ut)kt + ct + it  yt (22)
where
ht = lt(w

t )
w
1 w (23)
Capital transition law:
kt+1 = (1  )kt + F (it; it 1) (24)
Other conditions
The rental rate of capital
rkt = st(
lt
kt
)1  (25)
and marginal cost
st =
~wt
(1  )
 
(wt )
w
1 w ht
kt 1
!
(26)
Two Distortions
2664(1  p)
0B@1  p

~t
t
 1
1 f
1  p
1CA
f
+ p

~t
t
 f
1 f
3775
1 f
f
= pt (27)
2664(1  w)
0B@1  w

~w;t
w;t
 1
1 w
1  w
1CA
w
+ p

~w;t
w;t
 w
1 w
3775
1 w
w
= wt (28)
This is a under-determined system of 29 variabes in 28 equations. The variables are uc;t,  t, ct,
Ht, t, mt, Rt+1, qt, ut+1, rkt+1, Pk;t+1, w;t, kw;t, Fw;t, ~wt, Kp;t, Fp;t, Yt, kt, wt, it, lt, kt, st, rt,
~t,~w;t, pt , w

t . The description of monetary policy closes the system.
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